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THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
AND THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES
LUNc-=HU CHEN*
INTRODUCTION
The problem of refugees is a worldwide phenomenon.1 The
twentieth century has been called the century of refugees.2 Its
history is replete with mass displacements of peoples fleeing war,
political oppression, human rights deprivations or disasters of one
kind or another. Currently, there are about seventeen million ref-
ugees around the world.3 The specter of masses of refugees hud-
dled at national boundaries seeking asylum is common to the ex-
perience of many nations. The United States, being a nation of
immigrants and a land of opportunity, is certainly not immune
from such pressures, as most recently illustrated by the exodus of
the Haitian boat people destined for U.S. shores.4
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. LL.B., National Taiwan University,
1958; LL.M., Northwestern University School of Law, 1961; LL.M., Yale Law School,
1962; J.S.D., 1964. The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance of
James T. McClymonds in the preparation of this article. The author also gratefully
acknowledges the assistance of Brian Friel, Susan Henner, Leslie Kanocz, James V.
Marks, and Vinit Parmer.
1 See generally DEBORAH E. ANKER, THE LAW OF AsYLimu IN THE UNITED STATES: A
GUIDE TO AD~mSTRATrVE PRACTICE AND CASELAW 5-9 (2d ed. 1991) (surveying vari-
ous international responses to refugee problems).
2 See REFUGEES: A WoRLD REPORT 1 (Lester A. Sobel ed., 1979) (quoting German
novelist Heinrich Boll).
3 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, U.N. GAOR,
Supp. No. 12, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/47/12 (1992); U.S. Comm. for Refugees, World Refugee
Statistics, 1992 WoRLD REFUGEE Sunv. 32-33.
4 See Claire P. Gutekunst, Interdiction of Haitian Migrants on the High Seas: A
Legal and Policy Analysis, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 151, 154 (1984). For several decades,
political repression, human rights abuses and economic deprivation in Haiti have led
to a steady flow of migrants seeking refuge in the countries neighboring Haiti, and
the United States. Id. at 152-54. After the 1991 overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide's democratically elected government by members of the Haitian military, the
number of boat people trying to reach U.S. shores increased significantly, prompting
the Bush administration to resume a policy of interdiction and forced repatriation,
which had been temporarily suspended after the coup. See Howard W. French, U.S.
Starts to Return Haitians Who Fled Nation After Coup, N.Y. TIMs, Nov. 19, 1991, at
Al; Thomas L. Friedman, Haitians Returned Under New Policy, N.Y. Tims, May 27,
1992, at Al. Despite campaign promises to the contrary, President Clinton announced
that he would continue to enforce the Bush administration's policies. See Elaine Sci-
olino, Clinton Says U.S. Will Continue Ban on Haitian Exodus, N.Y. Tndms, Jan. 15,
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I. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS
Beginning under the League of Nations and extending
through the United Nations system, continuous international ef-
forts have been made to improve the status and treatment of those
who flee their land of origin in fear of persecution for political,
racial, religious, or other reasons.5 Post-World War II efforts re-
sulted not only in the creation of the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (the '"NHCR"),6 but also in the
adoption of two important refugee treaties-the 1951 United Na-
tions Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the "Conven-
tion"),7 and the 1969 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees (the "Protocol"). 8
Both the Convention and the Protocol define the term "refu-
gee" as any person who has a well-founded fear of persecution for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
1993, at Al. For a general history and appraisal of the human rights situation in
Haiti, see generally Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, U.N. Comm. on
Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/50 & Add.1 (1992).
5 See Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 1-19 (1983)
[hereinafter GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE]; 1 ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 12-27 (1966).
6 See GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE, supra note 5, at 129-31. The mandates of the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (the "UNHCR") are: to
provide international protection to refugees; to seek permanent solutions for the
problems of refugees; to promote the conclusion and supervise the application of inter-
national conventions for the protection of refugees; and to promote the implementa-
tion of measures calculated to improve the situation of refugees. Statute of the Office
of the High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. Res. 428, 5th Sess. Annex 5, U.N. GAOR,
Supp. No. 20, at 46-48, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950); see also P.D. Maynard, The Legal
Competence of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 31 IWNL & Comp.
L.Q. 415, 415-25 (1982) (discussing jurisdiction of UNHCR). See generally LOuISE W.
HOLBoRN, REFUGEES: A PROBLEM OF OUR TImE: THE WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COhMUSSIONER FOR REFUGEES 1951-1972 (1975) (providing comprehensive de-
scription of UNHCR's early work).
7 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force April 22, 1954) [hereinafter Convention]. For a
commentary on the Convention, see generally NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, CONVENTION RE-
LATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES: ITS HISTORY, CONTENTS AND INTERPRETATION
(1953); Paul Weis, The International Protection of Refugees, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 193
(1954) (stating goal of Convention is establishment of international legal status for
refugees and creation of international safeguards for its observation).
8 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter Protocol].
For a commentary on the Protocol, see generally Paul Weis, 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees and Some Questions of the Law of Treaties, 42 BmRT. Y.B. INTL
L. 39 (1967).
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social group, or political opinion.9 The Convention was originally
designed to address only refugee situations created before, or as a
result of, World War II. The definition of "refugee," therefore, was
limited to Europeans displaced from their country of nationality
as a result of events occuring prior to 1951.10 As the years passed,
and as new refugee situations emerged, the need was felt to make
the Convention applicable to new refugees. In response, the nego-
tiators of the Protocol removed the Convention's geographical and
temporal limitations in its definition of "refugee," thereby ex-
tending the Convention's protection to new refugees. 1 The Proto-
col not only expanded the potential range of refugees, but also in-
corporated by reference all substantive provisions of the
Convention.'
2
Of the various protections provided for refugees by both refu-
gee treaties, Article 33 of the Convention is the most important.
Article 33, commonly known as the principle of non-refoulement
(the principle of no forced return), 3 prescribes that a state party
"shall [not] expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion."
14
II. THE STATUTORY FRAmEWORK
In 1968, the United States became a party to the Protocol.' 5
Consequently, the United States became derivatively bound by all
9 See Convention, supra note 7, art. 1.-A(2); Protocol, supra note 8, art. 1.2; see
also GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 5, at 102-261.
10 See Convention, supra note 7, art. 1A.(2).
11 See Protocol, supra note 8, art. I; see also GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE, supra
note 5, at 12-13.
12 See Protocol, supra note 8, art. I.
13 See GooDwiN-GILL, THE REFUGEE, supra note 5, at 69. Some commentators
argue that the principle of non-refoulement has emerged as a generally accepted prin-
ciple of customary international law and is therefore binding on all states regardless
of whether or not they have adopted the Convention and the Protocol. See, e.g., Guy
S. Goodwin-Gill, Non-Refoulement and the New Asylum Seekers, 26 VA. J. INT'L L.
897, 898 (1986) (arguing that "moral obligation to assist refugees and to provide them
with refuge or safe haven has, over time and in certain contexts, developed into a
legal obligation"). But see Kay Hailbronner, Non-Refoulement and "Humanitarian"
Refugees: Customary International Law or Wishful Legal Thinking?, 26 VA. J. INT'L L.
857, 878 (1986) (stating that no international principle exists for providing temporary
refuge).
14 See Convention, supra note 7, art. 33.1.
15 59 DEP'T ST. BULL. 431 (1968).
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the substantive provisions of the 1951 Convention, including the
provision of no forced return.'6 It was not until 1980, however,
that Congress adopted domestic legislation to give effective ex-
pression to the international legal obligations assumed by the
United States in becoming a party to the Protocol.' 7
The Refugee Act of 1980,18 which amended the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952 (the "INA"),' 9 provides a comprehen-
sive framework for the admission of refugees into the United
States. The key to the Act is the definition of "refugee" in INA
section 101(a)(42), which grants "refugee" status to any person
who has fled their native country under a "well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion."2 °
For persons outside the United States, INA section 207 cre-
ates an Overseas Refugee Program. To be eligible for the pro-
gram, a person must not be firmly settled in a third country and
must fall within the section 101(a)(42) definition of "refugee."2 ' If
the person meets these eligibility requirements, the Attorney Gen-
eral has the discretion to admit the alien as a "refugee."22
For persons already within the United States, INA section
208 provides asylum procedures. Under section 208(a), the Attor-
ney General has the discretion to grant asylum to an alien if the
Attorney General determines that the alien is a "refugee" as de-
fined by section 101(a)(42). 3 Aliens admitted as "asylees" are en-
16 See Protocol, supra note 8, art. .1.
17 For a comprehensive analysis of the U.S. legal response to the refugee problem
since World War II, and a legislative history of the Refugee Act of 1980, see Deborah
E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the
Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DXE-o L. REv. 9 (1981); see also David A. Martin, The
Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and Future, 1982 MICH. Y.B. INr'L LEGAL SUD. 91; Im-
migration Law: Treatment of Refugees, 21 HARv. INT'L L.J. 742 (1980); Refugee Act of
1980, 10 DENY. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 155 (1980) (explaining how Act focuses U.S. policy
towards refugees and their admittance into country).
18 Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified in scattered sections at 8,
U.S.C. and at 22 U.S.C. § 2601).
19 Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1525 (1988 & Supp. 1991)).
20 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988). The Senate Judiciary Committee noted that the
new definition of "refugee" in the 1980 Act would bring U.S. law into conformity with
international treaty obligations under the U.N. Convention and the Protocol. S. REP.
No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 141.
21 See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(1) (1988); see also 8 C.F.R. § 207.1(b) (1993) (overseas
refugee program).
22 See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(1) (1988).
23 Id. § 1158(a).
[Vol. 67:469
REFUGEE PROTECTION
titled to federal assistance, as are "refugees."24 However, "asy-
lum" status is subject to continuing review, and such status may
be terminated if "circumstances" change in the alien's country.25
Another key provision of the Refugee Act is INA section 243.
Section 243 establishes, in principle, that aliens subject to depor-
tation shall be directed by the Attorney General to a country des-
ignated by the alien.28 Section 243(h), generally known as the
withholding of deportation provision, closely parallels the provi-
sions of non-refoulement as set forth in Article 33 of the U.N. Con-
vention. Section 243(h) provides that the Attorney General
"shall not deport or return any alien... to a country if the Attor-
ney General determines such aliens life or freedom would be
threatened in such country on account of race, religion, national-
ity, membership in a particular social group, or political
"28opinion.
HI. THE RoLE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Since the enactment of the Refugee Act, the number and
range of refugee and asylum claims heard by domestic courts, in-
cluding the United States Supreme Court, have expanded signifi-
cantly. The analysis applied by the Supreme Court in its early
cases demonstrated a willingness to interpret the Refugee Act in
accordance with international treaty obligations, thereby promot-
ing the human rights concerns underlying international refugee
law.
A Withholding of Deportation - INS v. Stevic
In 1984 the United States Supreme Court had its first oppor-
tunity to rule on the standards applicable in deportation hearings
under the Refugee Act. In INS v. Stevic,29 the Court addressed
the issue of whether a deportable alien must demonstrate a "clear
probability of persecution" in order to be entitled to withholding of
deportation under INA section 243(h). 0
24 See THoMAs A. ALE-aKoFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND
PoLIcy 735 (2d ed. 1991).
25 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (1988).
26 Id. § 1253(a).
27 See STEPmN H. IEGOMSKY, mIGmON LAw AND Poucy 839-42 (1992).
28 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988).
29 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
30 See id. at 409.
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The Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Stevens, unani-
mously answered this query in the affirmative. 3 ' The Court re-
viewed existing law and found that before the United States ac-
ceded to the U.N. Protocol in 1968, an alien who was already
within the United States was required to demonstrate a "clear
probability of persecution" or a "likelihood of persecution" in order
to avoid deportation under section 243(h).3 2 This standard, how-
ever, did not apply to an alien outside the United States seeking
refuge within the United States due to persecution. Such an alien
could gain admission to the United States through asylum pro-
ceedings by establishing a "good reason to fear persecution."33
The Court found that the legislative history of the United States
accession to the Protocol established that the President and the
Senate believed that the Protocol was largely consistent with ex-
isting law.34 However, while the Protocol raised questions about
the standard for section 243(h) claims, the U.S. accession did not
raise any questions concerning the standard to be applied to
claims for asylum.35
Turning to the text of section 243(h), as amended by the Refu-
gee Act, the Court observed that section 243(h) makes no mention
of the appropriate standard. 6 The Court stated:
To the extent such a standard can be inferred from the bare lan-
guage of the provision, it appears that a likelihood of persecution
is required. The section literally provides for withholding of de-
portation only if the alien's life or freedom "would" be threatened
in the country to which he would be deported; it does not require
withholding if the alien "might" or "could" be subject to persecu-
tion. Finally, § 243(h), both prior to and after amendment,
makes no mention of the term "refugee"; rather, any alien within
the United States is entitled to withholding if he meets the stan-
dard set forth. 7
The Court rejected Stevic's reliance on the "well-founded fear of
persecution" standard found in the definition of "refugee" under
both the Protocol and INA section 101(a)(42)(A). Because section
243(h), upon which Stevic relied, does not refer to the definition of
31 Id. at 413.
32 Id. at 414.
33 See id. at 414-16.
34 Stevic, 467 U.S. at 416-20.
35 Id.
36 See id. at 421-22.
37 Id. at 422 (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 67:469
REFUGEE PROTECTION
"refugee," the Court held that there is no textual basis for conclud-
ing that the "well-founded fear of persecution" standard is rele-
vant to withholding of deportation claims under section 243(h).3
The Court then reviewed the legislative history of the Refugee
Act to support its conclusion. The Court determined that the con-
gressional motivation for the enactment of the Refugee Act was to
revise and standardize the procedures governing the admission of
refugees into the United States.39 The Court discerned that while
the Act adopted and expanded upon the Protocol's definition of
"refugee," it was not intended to guarantee resettlement in the
United States or change the standard for withholding of deporta-
tion.40 Here, the Court thought it clear that Congress understood
that refugee status alone did not require withholding of deporta-
tion, but rather that the alien had to satisfy the standard under
seciton 243(h). In conclusion, the Court found nothing in the lan-
guage of section 243(h), the structure of the INA as amended or
the legislative history to support the conclusion that every alien
who qualifies as a "refugee" under the statutory definition is also
entitled to a withholding of deportation under section 243(h).4 '
Rather, in order to qualify for withholding of deportation, an alien
must demonstrate that "it is more likely than not that the alien
would be subject to persecution" in the country to which the alien
would be returned.42
B. Well-Founded Fear of Persecution-INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
In Stevic, the Supreme Court expressly declined to decide the
meaning of the phrase "well-founded fear of persecution" applica-
ble to requests for discretionary asylum under the Act.43 The
Court revisited the issue, however, in 1986 in the case of INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca.4 In Cardoza-Fonseca, a Nicaraguan citizen
subject to deportation proceedings requested withholding of de-
portation pursuant to section 243(h) and applied for asylum as a
refugee pursuant to section 208(a).45 In support of her claims,
Cardoza-Fonseca offered evidence that her brother had been tor-
38 See id. at 422-24.
39 Stevic, 467 U.S. at 425.
40 Id. at 420.
41 See id. at 421-28.
42 Id. at 429-30.
43 See id. at 430.
44 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
45 See id. at 424.
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tured and imprisoned because of political activities in Nicaragua.
She believed that she would be tortured and interrogated about
her brother's whereabouts if returned to Nicaragua.46
In an opinion delivered by Justice Stevens, a divided Court
held that the section 243(h) "clear probability" standard of proof
does not apply to asylum applications under section 208(a).47 In-
stead, the "well-founded fear of persecution" standard governs
asylum applications under section 208(a).48 In support of its con-
clusion, the Court set forth the basic distinctions between the asy-
lum provisions of section 208(a) and the withholding of deporta-
tion provisions of section 243(h). First, the well-founded fear of
persecution standard under section 208(a) is more generous than
the "clear probability of persecution" standard: the reference to
"fear" in the former standard makes it more subjective by focusing
to some extent on the mental state of claimants, while the latter
standard is more objective requiring claimants to establish by ob-
jective evidence that they are more likely than not to suffer perse-
cution upon deportation.49 Second, section 208 is discretionary,
leaving the Attorney General the discretion to grant asylum,
while section 243(h) is mandatory, leaving the Attorney General
no discretion to withhold deportation.5 0 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Court made reference to the statutory language of the
Refugee Act, its legislative history, congressional intent, and past
practices.51 The Court emphasized that the legislative history of
the Act demonstrated the congressional intent to interpret the
term "refugee" in conformity with the Protocol.5 2 The Court also
gave prominent attention to the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees Handbook5 3 as an aid in the task of interpreta-
tion, and concluded that the Refugee Act framework was consis-
tent with the U.S. obligations under the Convention and the
Protocol.5
4
46 See id. at 424-25.
47 See id. at 430.
48 See id. at 427-28.
49 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430-31.
50 See id. at 427-29, 443-44.
51 See id. at 427-43.
52 See id. at 436-38.
53 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCE-
DURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS (Geneva 1979) [hereinafter
UNHCR HANDBOOK].
54 See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 438-41. For a discussion of the standard ap-
plied by the Board of Immigration Appeals and lower courts in response to Cardoza-
476 [Vol. 67:469
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IV. RECENT SuPREME COURT DECISIONS
A Reopening Deportation Proceedings
In the Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca cases, the Supreme Court
demonstrated a willingness to exercise its power of judicial review
to ensure that the application of U.S. refugee law would be consis-
tent with international refugee law. By going beyond a purely tex-
tual analysis of the Refugee Act and analyzing the Act against the
background of its legislative history and the Convention and Pro-
tocol, the Court gave effect to congressional intent to bring U.S.
law into conformity with international law.55 Two decisions in the
Court's most recent term, however, appear to signal a retreat from
this position and an erosion of the Supreme Court's role in the
development of legal protection for refugees.
The first case, INS v. Doherty,56 illustrates the interplay be-
tween extradition and asylum law. Doherty, a citizen of both Ire-
land and the United Kingdom, had been found guilty in absentia
for the murder of a British Army officer whom Doherty and other
members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army had ambushed
in Northern Ireland, but had escaped to the United States in
1982.57 In 1983 the INS located Doherty and began deportation
proceedings against him."5 Doherty then applied for asylum under
Fonseca, see ALEmQoFF & MARTN, supra note 24, at 759-66; see also Michael E.
Mangelson, Three Years After Matter of Mogharrabi: Is a 'Reasonable Person" Test the
Answer to the Confusing "Well-Founded Fear of Persecution" Standard in Asylum
Cases?, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rav. 1123 (stating that "well-founded fear of persecution
based on reasonable person standard substantially conforms to U.N. Protocol and will
protect bona fide refugees). In 1990, the INS adopted regulations that provide further
guidance on the application of the governing standards. The regulations provide that
the applicant has a "well-founded fear of persecution" if there is a reasonable possibil-
ity of actually suffering such persecution if returned to the applicant's country. 8
C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2) (1993). Applicants need not demonstrate that they have been
"singled out" if there is evidence of a pattern or practice of persecution based on race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Id.
Past persecution of the applicant creates a presumption of well-founded fear. Id.
§ 208.13(b)(1). To be eligible for withholding of deportation, the applicant must show
that persecution would more likely than not occur. Id. § 208.16(b)(1).
55 See Karen K Jorgenson, The Role of the U.S. Congress and Courts in the Appli-
cation of the Refugee Act of 1980, in REFUGEE LAw AND PoLicy: INTENATIONAL AND
U.S. RESPONSES 129 (Ved P. Nanda ed., 1989). Jorgenson suggests that the Court did
not go far enough in protecting refugees as required by international law. Id. She
argues that the Court's positivistic reasoning has been used to construe the Act too
narrowly; thus, asylum procedures required by the U.N. Protocol are denied. Id.
56 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992).
57 Id. at 722.
58 Id.
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section 208., 9 The deportation proceedings were suspended, how-
ever, upon the initiation of extradition proceedings by the United
States on behalf of the United Kingdom.6 °
In 1984 Doherty's extradition was denied. 61 The extradition
magistrate held that Doherty was not extraditable because his
crimes fell within the political offenses exception to the United
States-United Kingdom extradition treaty.62 When the Govern-
ment's attacks on the ruling failed, deportation proceedings were
resumed.63
Doherty believed that if he was immediately deported to Ire-
land, he would be safe from extradition to the United Kingdom.
Therefore, at a deportation hearing in 1986, Doherty conceded de-
portability, designated Ireland as the country to which he be de-
ported, and withdrew his application for asylum and withholding
of deportation.64
While Doherty's designation was being appealed, however,
Ireland adopted the Irish Extradition Act (the "IEA), 65 which ef-
fectively eliminated the political offenses exception as between
Ireland and the United Kingdom, and thus, if Doherty had then
been deported from the United States to Ireland, he would have
been extradited to the United Kingdom. Doherty thereafter
moved to reopen his deportation proceedings, claiming that the
newly enacted IEA constituted "new" evidence regarding his
claims for asylum and withholding of deportation.66 Attorney
General Richard Thornburgh denied Doherty's motion to reopen
either proceeding.6 7
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, re-
versed the Thornburgh order on the grounds that the Attorney
General abused his discretion in denying the motion to reopen.68
The Second Circuit held that the passage of the IEA and the de-
nial of Doherty's original designation by former Attorney General
Edwin Meese constituted new evidence that entitled Doherty to
59 See id.
60 See id.
61 Doherty, 112 S. Ct. at 722.
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See Extradition Act (European Convention of the Suppression of Terrorism)
(Ir. 1987).
66 See Doherty, 112 S. Ct. at 723.
67 See id.
68 See id. at 723-24.
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have his deportation proceedings reopened.69 Moreover, the court
held that Thornburgh erred in determining that Doherty was not
entitled to withholding of deportation.70
A divided Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and
held that the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in de-
nying the motion to reopen. 71 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that there is no statutory authority under the
INA for reopening proceedings.7 2 Applying the "abuse of discre-
tion" standard and relying on INS v. Abudu v3 Rehnquist found
that the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion because the
treaty upon which the lEA was based, the European Convention
of the Suppression of Terrorism, 74 had been in effect at the time
Doherty withdrew his applications for asylum and withholding of
deportation and therefore did not constitute "new" material
evidence.75
Justice Scalia filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and
dissenting in part. Justice Scalia agreed with the Court's ruling
that the Attorney General has broad discretion in denying mo-
tions to reopen asylum proceedings because the granting of asy-
lum is itself subject to the discretion of the Attorney General.7 6
However, Scalia disagreed with the breadth of discretion the
Court afforded the Attorney General in granting or denying mo-
tions to reopen withholding of deportation proceedings. Scalia
noted that the withholding of deportation provisions of the Refu-
gee Act are mandatory in nature, paralleling the U.S. mandatory
non-refoulement obligations under Article 33 of the Convention. 7
He argued that because of the mandatory nature of the withhold-
ing of deportation provisions, the Attorney General has no discre-
tion to deny a motion to reopen and then to further proceed with
deportation without a hearing to determine if the alien satisfies
the requirements of section 243(h).78 Moreover, Scalia reasoned
that the discretion afforded the Attorney General in the Abudu
case, to grant asylum or the suspension of deportation, did not ap-
69 See id. at 723.
70 See id. at 723-24.
71 Doherty, 112 S. Ct. at 724.
72 See id.
73 485 U.S. 94 (1988).
74 Extradition Act, supra note 65.
75 See Doherty, 112 S. Ct. at 724-26.
76 Id. at 728 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77 Id. at 728-29.
78 Id.
1993] 479
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ply in Doherty because the Attorney General does not have the
discretion to grant or deny withholding of deportation.79 Simply
put, the majority's reliance on Abudu as the ground for denying
the reopening was misplaced. 0
By granting broad discretion to the Attorney General in the
Doherty case, the Supreme Court weakened the protection af-
forded aliens who qualify for withholding of deportation, or non-
refoulement. In applying the same standard of discretion to deter-
minations of whether to reopen proceedings under section 243(h)
as is applied to determinations of whether to reopen asylum pro-
ceedings, the Court undermined the mandatory relief afforded ref-
ugees who can show that their life or liberty would be threatened
if deportation is executed. In so doing, the Court gave no consider-
ation to the effect this decision would have on the United States
mandatory obligations under the Convention or Protocol. More-
over, the Court's decision allowed the Government to utilize de-
portation proceedings as a surrogate for unsuccessful extradition
proceedings, further eroding the protection of aliens threatened
with persecution on political grounds."-
B. Persecution on Account of Political Opinion
In a second opinion decided last term, the Supreme Court had
occasion to interpret the substantive aspects of the "well-founded
fear" standard. In INS v. Elias-Zacarias,8 ' the issue was whether
a guerrilla organization's attempt to coerce a person into perform-
ing military service necessarily constitutes "persecution on ac-
count of ... political opinion."8 3
In 1987, Elias-Zacarias, a native of Guatemala, was ap-
proached at his home by two guerrillas seeking to recruit him. 4
When Elias-Zacarias refused, the guerrillas threatened to return
and "take" him or "kill" him if he did not change his mind.8 5 Elias-
Zacarias did not want to join the guerrillas because he was afraid
79 Id. at 729-30.
80 Doherty, 112 S. Ct. at 729-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81 See Michael J. Bowe, Deportation as De Facto Extradition: The Matter of Jo-
seph Doherty, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INr'L & Comp. L. 263 (1990) (arguing governmental
use of deportation ignores function and rationales underlying these two mechanisms).
82 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
83 See id. at 814.
84 See id.
85 See id. at 817 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
480 [Vol. 67:469
REFUGEE PROTECTION
of retribution by the government if he did so.8 6 Fearing that the
guerrillas might return, he fled to the United States, where he
was later subjected to deportation proceedings.8 7
Elias-Zacarias applied for asylum and withholding of deporta-
tion. An Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals (the "BIA") denied his application on the grounds that the
evidence did not establish persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of political opinion. 8 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA ruling, holding that
"acts of conscription by a nongovernmental group constitute perse-
cution on account of political opinion, and determined that Elias-
Zacarias had a 'well-founded fear' of such conscription." 9
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, reversed
the Ninth Circuit, holding that a guerrilla organization's attempt
to recruit a person did not necessarily constitute persecution on
the account of political opinion.90 First, the Court reasoned that a
person might resist recruitment for a variety of nonpolitical rea-
sons, such as a fear of combat or a desire to remain at home or
earn a better living.9 Second, the Court reasoned that the guer-
rillas' motives for recruiting persons to fulfill their own political
goals did not render the forced conscription "persecution on ac-
count of ... political opinion. 92 The Court held that the plain
meaning of the phrase "persecution on account of ... political
opinion" means persecution on account of the victim's political
opinion, not that of the persecutors. As the Court explained:
If a Nazi regime persecutes Jews, it is not, within the ordinary
meaning of language, engaging in persecution on account of
political opinion; and if a fundamentalist Moslem regime perse-
cutes democrats, it is not engaging in persecution on account of
religion. Thus, the mere existence of a generalized "political" mo-
tive underlying the guerrillas' forced recruitment is inadequate
to establish (and, indeed, goes far to refute) the proposition that
Elias-Zacarias fears persecution on account of political opinion,
as section 101(a)(42) requires.93
86 See id. at 814.
87 Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 814-15.
88 See id. at 815.
89 See id.
90 See id.
91 See id. at 815-16.
92 Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 816.
93 Id. at 816.
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Finding that Elias-Zacarias had failed to establish a "well-founded
fear" of persecution because of his political opinions, rather than
his refusal to fight with the guerrillas, the Court declined to ad-
dress Elias-Zacarias's argument that taking sides with any polit-
ical faction is itself an expression of political opinion. 4
Justice Stevens, in a dissent with two other Justices, dis-
agreed with the majority's reasoning on both counts. First, Ste-
vens argued that political opinion can be expressed both nega-
tively and affirmatively. Choosing to remain neutral, even if
motivated by a desire to remain with one's family, is, in Stevens'
view, an act of political expression that the asylum provisions of
the Refugee Act were intended to protect:
A rule that one must identify with one of two dominant warring
political factions in order to possess a political opinion, when
many persons may, in fact, be opposed to the views and policies
of both, would frustrate one of the basic objectives of the Refugee
Act of 1980 - to provide protection to all victims of persecution
regardless of ideology. Moreover, construing "political opinion"
in so short-sighted and grudging a manner could result in limit-
ing the benefits under the ameliorative provisions of our immi-
gration laws to those who join one political extreme or another;
moderates who choose to sit out a battle would not qualify.95
Stevens found more than adequate evidence in the record to sup-
port the conclusion that Elias-Zacarias's refusal to join the guer-
rillas was a form of political expression within the meaning of
"political opinion."9 6
Second, Stevens determined that the guerrillas' threat to
"take" or "kill" Elias-Zacarias was sufficient to establish a "well-
founded fear" of persecution. Stevens reasoned that the Refugee
Act did not require the alien to prove the motivation behind his
persecutors' conduct; the alien need only show a "reasonable possi-
bility" of persecution.9 7
In marked contrast to the Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca deci-
sions, and even Scalia's own dissent in Doherty, no consideration
was given in Elias-Zacarias to congressional intent or to the effect
such a narrow interpretation of "political opinion" would have on
94 See id.
95 Id. at 818 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767
F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1985)).
96 See id. at 819 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97 Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 819-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440).
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the U.S. obligations under international law. By grounding the de-
cision on the so-called "ordinary meaning" of the term "political
opinion," Scalia indulged in the sort of semantic argument typical
in the application of "plain meaning" analysis. As recognized by
Stevens, such an analysis fails to take into account the purposes
that the Refugee Act sought to accomplish.
9 8
V. INTERDICTION OF HAITIAN REFUGEES AND NON-REFOULE E IT
The most recent Supreme Court decisions on the protection of
refugees reveal a trend away from consideration of the underlying
humanitarian concerns and international human rights implica-
tions of U.S. refugee policy. Instead, the Court appears to prefer
emphasizing matters of administrative law and the application of
procedural rules, rather than focusing on the fundamental human
rights that are implicated. This trend was continued in the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Sale v. Haitian Centers Coun-
cil, Inc.99
The case resolved a split in the circuits over the application of
the non-refoulement provisions of the Refugee Act to Haitians in-
terdicted outside United States territory. In Haitian Refugee
98 See id. at 818-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993). In a related proceeding filed in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of NY, Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 817 F.
Supp. 336 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), Judge Sterling Johnson Jr. ordered medical treatment for
Haitian refugees sick with AIDS detained at the naval base at Guantanamo Bay. See
Deborah Sontag, Judge Orders Better Care for Haitians With AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
27, 1993, at 9. About 250 Haitian refugees detained at Guantanamo were found to
have credible claims of political persecution and had permission from the INS to come
to the United States. Id. Since they or members of their families tested positive for
HIV, however, their entry into the United States was refused based on an administra-
tive regulation that allowed the exclusion and their detainment at the naval base for
16 months. See id.; Ron Howell, Finding the "Promised Land": Haitian Refugees
Given Shelter in Brooklyn Amid HIV Storm, NEWSDAY, Apr. 18, 1993, at 16. After a
two-week trial, Judge Johnson, in an interim order issued without opinion on March
26, 1993, ordered medical treatment for the Haitians "to prevent loss of life." Sale,
817 F. Supp. at 337. Since the naval base lacks adequate facilities to treat the sickest
Haitians, Judge Johnson ordered that they be brought to the United States for treat-
ment. Id. at 337. Fifty-one refugees who qualified for this treatment were released
and the remainder, about 200 refugees remained at Guantanamo. Howell, supra, at
16.
For a discussion of U.S. policy regarding the Haitian refugees, see generally
Cheryl Little, United States Haitian Policy: A History of Discrimination, 10 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. Huni. RTs. 269 (1993); Arthur C. Helton, The United States Government Pro-
gram of Intercepting and Forcibly Returning Haitian Boat People to Haiti: Policy Im-
plications and Prospects, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. Hum. RTs. 325 (1993).
19931
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Center, Inc. v. Baker,'0 0 the Eleventh Circuit held that Haitians
challenging the United States Government policy of interdiction
and repatriation without agency review of their claims could not
avail themselves of judicial review because they never reached the
borders of the United States. 10 1 The court ruled that the rights
regarding asylum claims vested only for aliens who had reached
the United States. 10 2 In Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. Mc-
Nary,103 the Second Circuit interpreted section 243(h) and took
the view that the non-refoulement provisions of the Act did apply
to Haitians interdicted on the high seas. In the Second Circuit's
view, section 243(h) makes no distinction between aliens seized
inside or outside the United States, and Congress intended that
the prohibition against the "return" of aliens to their persecutors
apply to aliens seized extraterritorially.10 The Second Circuit
found support for this conclusion in the object and purpose of the
Convention and specifically the non-refoulement provisions of Ar-
ticle 33.105
This split is consistent with the considerable debate regarding
whether the principle of non-refoulement applies to refugees on
the high seas. 106 Those who argue against extraterritorial appli-
cation of the principle tend to rely on statements made during the
negotiation of the treaty which suggest that a refugee must reach
the territory of a contracting state before non-refoulement protec-
tion attaches. 10 7 Commentators who argue that non-refoulement
does apply extraterritorially, on the other hand, rely on the plain
language of Article 33, citing practices subsequent to the negotia-
tion of the Convention, including those of the Reagan-Bush ad-
ministration itself, and customary international law.10 8 For ex-
ample, the UNHCR, in its amicus curiae brief in Sale, argued that
Article 33 is unambiguous in its proscription against the return of
refugees to the country of their persecution, and that to do so
would violate the Convention's broad remedial and humanitarian
goals of assuring "refugees the widest possible exercise of... fun-
100 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
101 See id. at 1505.
102 See id. at 1505-06.
103 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council,
Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
104 See id. at 1360-61.
105 See id. at 1361-63.
106 See Gutekunst, supra note 4, at 167-73.
107 See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 7, at 163.
108 See, e.g., id.; Goodwin-Gill, supra note 13, at 899-903.
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damental rights and freedoms." 10 9 Moreover, the customary obli-
gation of non-return, which, according to the TNHCR, has at-
tained the status of a "peremptory norm of international law" and
is therefore not governed by geographical or territorial limita-
tions, also confirms the plain language of Article 33.110
The UNHCR Handbook does not specifically address the prin-
ciple of non-refoulement and whether it applies to aliens inter-
dicted on the high seas; since Article 33 includes the term "refu-
gee," the Handbook's comments on the application of the term
provide some guidance. The UNHCR Handbook provides that
once an alien fulfills the criteria for a refugee as defined by the
Convention, that person automatically has "refugee" status. "This
would necessarily occur prior to the time at which his refugee sta-
tus is formally determined.""1 Because Article 33 contains the
term "refugee," a person would be entitled to non-refoulement pro-
tection once he fulfills the criteria for a "refugee." Article 33 does
not make any reference to the refugee's current location. On the
contrary, it specifically makes reference to the refugee's past loca-
tion, the country where the refugee's life or freedom would be
threatened. Based on this reasoning, the Second Circuit in Mc-
Nary concluded that the Convention does not require an alien to
reach the shores of the deporting or returning country before the
protection of Article 33 attaches. 11
2
The Supreme Court, as it had done in Doherty and Elias-
Zacarias, took a narrow approach to the interpretative dilemmas
posed by the McNary appeal. In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,
Inc.," 3 the Court adopted the Eleventh Circuit's agreement with
the United States Government's interpretation on interdiction
and repatriation, reversing the Second Circuit's McNary deci-
sion.1 14 The Court held that section 243(h)(1) of the INA and Arti-
cle 33 of the Convention do not prohibit the President from in-
terdicting Haitians in international waters and forcing their
return to Haiti without the benefit of either a deportation or an
109 Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S.
Ct. 2549 (1993).
110 See id.
111 UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 53, at 9.
112 See Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1361-63 (2d Cir.
1992), rev'd sub nom., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
113 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
114 Id. at 2567.
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exclusion hearing to determine their refugee status.1 1 In reach-
ing its decision, the Court analyzed both the text and history of
section 243(h)(1) and Article 33.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, reasoned that the
plain meaning of section 243(h)(1) and its requirements and limi-
tations relating to the treatment of refugees refers solely to the
Attorney General. According to Stevens, the section "cannot rea-
sonably be construed to describe either the President or the Coast
Guard."" 6 Moreover, Stevens noted, absent clear statutory lan-
guage or legislative history to the contrary, there is a presumption
that Acts of Congress do not normally have extraterritorial effect,
especially if a statute involves foreign or military affairs, which
are a unique responsibility of the President." 7
In further analyzing the text of the statute, the Court repudi-
ated the respondent's broad interpretation of the word "return"
within the section. The respondents had argued that the word "re-
turn" referred solely to the destination to which the alien may be
removed." 8 According to Justice Stevens, such an interpretation
would be broad enough to encompass aliens involved in both de-
portation and exclusion proceedings, thus making the word "de-
port" within the section redundant and unnecessary." 9 Rather,
Stevens adopted a narrower interpretation of the word "return,"
drawing a distinction between the word "return" as referring to
the action involved in an exclusion hearing and the word "deport"
as referring to the action involved in a deportation hearing. 20
Justice Stevens noted that the use of "return and deport" implies
an exclusively territorial application in that both words reflect the
"traditional division between the two kinds of aliens and the two
kinds of hearings."' 2'
The Court found additional support for its interpretation in
the legislative history of the 1980 amendment of section 243(h)(1).
The section was amended by adding the word "return" and remov-
ing the phrase "within the United States." 2 2 For the majority,
this signalled congressional intent to afford broader protection to
115 Id. at 2560-65.
116 Id. at 2559.
117 Id. at 2567.
118 Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2560.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 2560-61.
121 Id. at 2560.
122 Id. at 2561.
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aliens who are within United States territory, but not yet within
the United States. 2 ' This distinction between being within
United States territory and within the United States for purposes
of section 243(h)(1) was first addressed by the Supreme Court in
Leng May Ma v. Barber.124 Illustratively, an alien who is at or
near the U.S. border seeking admission is physically in U.S. terri-
tory; however, for purposes of the statute, the alien is not within
the United States. Accordingly, the amendment provided that
section 243(h)(1), in addition to applying to deportation proceed-
ings (within the United States), would apply to exclusion hearings
(within U.S. territory but not within the United States).
On the other hand, the Court discerned no basis for finding
that the statute was intended to reach beyond U.S. territory. The
Court stated that if Congress had intended an extraterritorial ef-
fect, it would have expressly provided for such a broad application
in the statute itself or in the legislative history.12
5
The Court, in analyzing the text and the negotiation history of
Article 33 of the Convention, arrived at the same conclusion it
reached in analyzing section 243(h)(1)-that there is no indication
that the drafters of the Article intended an extraterritorial appli-
cation. First, the Court rejected the broad interpretation of the
Article proposed by the Haitians because such a reading "create[s]
an absurd anamoly [in that] dangerous aliens on the high seas
would be entitled to the benefits of [Art.] 33.1 while those residing
in the country that sought to expel them would not." 2 6 Second,
the Court determined that the terms "expel or return ('refouler')"
were the "obvious parallel to the words "deport or return" in sec-
tion 243(h)(1). 12 7 The word "expel," the Court stated, has the
identical meaning of "deport" in that both refer to the deportation
or expulsion of an alien already within the host country.'28 The
term "return ('refouler)' refers to the exclusion of aliens who are
on "the threshold of initial entry." 2 9 The term implies a "defen-
sive act of resistance or exclusion at a border rather than an act of
transporting someone to a particular destination," thus, the Court
13 Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2561.
124 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
125 Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2561.
126 Id. at 2563.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 2563 (citing Leng May Ma, 357 U.S. at 187 (quoting Shaughnessy v.
United States, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953))).
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reasoned, it has a legal meaning narrower than its common
meaning.130
Finally, the Court found support for its opinion in the Con-
vention's negotiation history. Stevens relied on statements made
by the Swiss representative and supported by others.1 3 ' Those
representatives had opined that "the word 'expulsion' referred to a
refugee already admitted into a country, whereas the word 'return
("refouler")' related to a refugee already within the territory but
not yet resident there."1 3 2
In dissent, Justice Blackmun criticized the overly technical
approach taken by the majority in derogation of the fundamental
human rights considerations inherent in the non-refoulement ar-
gument. As he remarked, "If any canon of construction should be
applied in this case, it is the well-settled rule that 'an act of con-
gress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible contruction remains.'" 3 3 To do otherwise,
Blackmun concluded, would be to "close our ears" to the Haitians'
"modest plea. " 134
In Sale, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to make a
significant contribution to the progessive development of both in-
ternational and domestic refugee law. Unfortunately, the Court
did not sound a battle cry, but rather sent the message that the
United States is retreating from an active role in the promotion of
the international rights of refugees. The Sale decision strikes a
serious blow against international efforts to provide protection for
the thousands of people who have been forced to seek asylum
abroad because of human rights deprivations at home.
CONCLUSION
It cannot be overemphasized that the Refugee Act is not just
another statute. It is a statute that is designed to implement and
give effective expression to the obligations assumed by the United
States under international refugee law, which is part of the
supreme law of the land.13 5 The standards applicable to refugees,
both in formulation and interpretation, must conform with rele-
130 Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2564.
131 Id. at 2565-66.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 2577 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Murray v. The Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)).
134 Id. at 2577 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
135 See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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vant international standards. It would appear essential that, in
giving meaning to a particular provision in a concrete case, the
Court adopt a method of contextual interpretation that fully takes
into account the underlying purposes, the legislative history (both
domestic and international), subsequent practice, alternative
value consequences, and other relevant factors involved in a par-
ticular context. 13 6 The underlying policy of humanity and human
rights should be given the fullest possible expression even under
the pressures of other considerations.
136 See LuNG-cmU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
LAw: A POLIcy-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 277-80 (1989). See generally MYREs S. Mc-
DOUGAL, ET AL., THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:
PRINCIPLES OF CON T AND PROCEDURE (1967).
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